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ABSTRACT
This paper first investigates the effects of alternatives modes of deficit financing on the unem-
ployment rate, inflation rate, and the real interest rate, within the framework of a small com-
plete macroeconomic model. Secondly, it examines the nature of monetary and fiscal reaction
functions. The two periods 1923-1960 and 1961-1982 are considered, with substantial differ-
ences in behavior and policy being shown to exist between them. The most important conclu-
sion is that long-run monetary neutrality properties shown to exist over the latter period are
not intrinsic to the economy, but rather are the result of the stabilization policies being con-











Coral Cables, FL 331241
1. INTRODUCTION
In a recent paper, Turnovsky and Wohar (1984) (henceforth T-W) use annual data over
the period 1923-1982 to test econometrically a number of monetarist propositions.' As the
empirical evidence suggests the existence of a structural break in the data around 1960, they
examine these propositions for the two subperiods 1923-1960 and 19611982.2 They conclude
that the results for the latter period provide convincing support for the propositions they
examine. In particular, the long-run neutrality of money, which was previously demonstrated
by Stein (1978), is shown to hold over this period. However, T-W present further evidence to
suggest that this neutrality is essentially generated by government policy in effect over this
period and is not an intrinsic property of the economic structure.
The results obtained for the early period 1923-1960 are less supportive of these same
propositions. Although some still do hold, the key ones pertaining to the long-run neutrality
of money are not satisfied.
Although most of their analysis focuses on the effects of changes in the monetary growth
rate on unemployment and inflation, T-W also give brief consideration to the hypothesis that:
"government expenditures which are not financed through money creation have relatively
negligible effects upon the rates of unemployment and inflation." They test this proposition by
considering the statistical significance of government purchases of goods and services, which
is included in the unemployment equation. This method of testing the proposition is not
entirely satisfactory, since no effort is made to decompose government purchases of goods and
services into those which are financed by money creation and those which are financed by
newly-issued bonds.
This paper has two major objectives. The first is to test the above proposition within the
framework of a small complete macroeconomic model. In particular, this study investigates
the effects of alternative modes of deficit financing on the rate of unemployment, the inflation
rate, and the real interest rate. It accepts the findings of T-W and others regarding the struc-2
tural break which appears to have occurred around 1960 and compares the nature of the
effects over the two subperiods 1923-1960 and 1961-1982.
The second objective of this paper is to examine the nature of the government monetary
and fiscal reaction functions in greater detaiL The main purpose of this is to show more pre-
cisely how the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy, together with the structural
relationships in the economy, generate the long-run neutrality properties obtained by Stein
and T-W over the more recent period.
The large Federal deficits since the 1974-1975 recession have rekindled interest in the
economic consequences of both the size of the government deficit and its mode of financing.
A key issue motivating this has been the question of "crowding Out." Several authors have
developed theoretical models directed at this issue and at comparing the effects of bond-
financed and money-financed government expenditures on the rate of inflation; see, e.g.,
Blinder and Solow (1973), Pyle and Turnovsky (1976) for early examples. The general con-
clusions of these, and subsequent studies are not unambiguous; it is clear that the effects are
sensitive to the structure of the modeL
Given the inclusive theoretical work, it is surprising to note that little empirical work has
been directed at this specific issue. Stein (1976) provides the first empirical investigation
which focuses on the effects of debt finance. Examining the period 1961-1973, he finds that a
debt-financed increase in the government deficit, resulting from a tax reduction, will reduce
inflation and increase unemployment. That is, debt-financed fiscal policies crowd out an even
greater amount of private spending. He concludes that only budget deficits financed through
money creation will effectively increase aggregate demand. Maital (1979) finds that including
an inflationary expectations proxy in Stein's model strengthens these findings. Butkiewicz
(1981), using data over the period 1960(I) through through 1 976(IY), tests for crowding out in
an alternative model and also re-estimates Stein's model for an extended time period, with
mixed results Debt growth is found to increase real output growth significantly, to have a3
positive but insignificant impact on employment, and to reduce inflation. The first effect con-
tradicts crowding out, but the second supports it. Barro (1980) finds that unanticipated debt
growth is expansionary in that it increases output and reduces unemployment. Desai and
Blake (1982) re-estimate Stein's (1976) model by a maximum likelihood technique and con-
tradict his results. Thus, in short, the efficacy of money-financing vs. bond-financing remains
an open question.
Previous studies have been conducted using limited samples of postwar data. Except for
Butkiewicz, all use par value of debt, rather than market values. Recent estimates of market
values of federal debt (Seater (1981), Cox and Hirschorn (1983), and Butkiewicz (1983)) facil-
itate the construction of a series of the market value of debt extending over the period 1923-
1982. The tests conducted in this study use annual data over this period, which incorporates a
much wider range of experience, including the depression and wartime financing.
Although most economists speak of endogenous stabilization policy, very few incor-
porate this aspect into their empirical work. In recent years, the authors of numerous
econometric studies of fiscal and monetary policies have warned that the policy variables they
are treating as exogenous should perhaps be treated as endogenous, if in fact the stabilization
authorities were pursuing an active countercydical policy during the period in question.3
Furthermore, it monetary and fiscal authorities do react systematically to economic events, it
is important that each policy maker be aware of the reaction function of the other, in order
that policy making be properly coordinated. One of the contributions of this study is to exam-
ine the interrelationships between these two policy instruments, particularly during the recent
period.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a small
macroeconomic model which forms the basis for our analysis. The estimating equations are
derived in Section 3 while the estimating procedures used are discussed in the following sec-
tion. The empirical results for the two periods are discussed in Sections 5and6, respectively,4
and the conclusions are presented in the final section. A detailed description of the data
together with their sources, is given in an Appendix.
2. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we outline the theoretical framework underlying our subsequent empirical
analysis. It is a conventional macroeconomic model, similar to that developed by Turnovsky
(1977) and used by T-W, although unlike the latter it is necessary to include the government
budget constraint, wealth effects, and policy specifications, in order to incorporate those
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Price Adjustment and Inflationary Expectations
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T =i:Y +rB_1/P) O<r< 1 (4c)
MB
—i— = b0+b1DEF+b2U+b3ir+b4p (4d)
b1>O, b2>O, b3<O, b4>O
G specified below (4e)
where
=realaggregate demand at time t,
= realoutput at time t,
= nominalinterest rate at time t,
=expectedrate of inflation formed at time t,forthe period (t, t÷ 1),
=nominalwealth at time t,
=GNPdeflator at time t(pricelevel at time t),
= realgovernment purchases of goods and services,
M =nominalmoney demand at time t,
= nominalmoney supply at time t,
MB =nominalmonetary base at time t,
DEF =thereal government deficit at time t,
Q = thephysical quantity of government bonds held by the domestic public at6
time t,
= priceof government bonds at time t,
B = qQ=nominalmarket value of government bonds held by the domestic
public at time 1,
= unemploymentrate at time t,
= rateof nominal monetary growth at time t,
= "equilibrium"rate of inflation at time t,
= actualrate of inflation at time t,
= federaltax revenue, measured in real terms.
Equation (la) describes the production function in terms of an inverse relationship
between real output and unemployment. Aggregate demand is defined in (ib), as a positive
function of real disposable income and wealth and a negative function of the real interest
rate.4 Equation (Ic) specifies a simple lagged adjustment process in output; excess demand for
output at time t—1leads to an increase in output during the following period.
The demand for real money balances is specified in (2a) as a positive function of real
income and wealth and a negative function of the nominal interest rate. The money supply,
described by (2b), equals the product of the money multiplier, which is a function of the nom-
inal interest rate, and the monetary base. Money market equilibrium is specified in (2c), while
nominal private wealth is defined in (2d) to be the sum of base money and the private sector's
holdings of government bonds.5
Equation (3a) specifies that the "equilibrium" rate of inflation--the rate of inflation after
all lags have been worked through--depends inversely upon the rate of unemployment and
positively upon the excess demand for output, both lagged by one period, together with the
expected rate of inflation for the present period. Equations of this type are common in the
macro literature.6 They can be justified in various ways, including as being the reduced form
of an expectations-augmented Phillips curve, coupled with a simple price mark-up rule. The7
absence of money illusion would of course requite=1.But the sample set used in this
study extends over a long time horizon over part of which at least previous empirical studies
of price and wage determination do not necessarily support this restriction. Equation (3b)
describes a simple lagged adjustment equation for inflation, analogous to that of output, (1 c).
It postulates that the observed rate of inflation adjusts towards the equilibrium defined in (3a).
Inflationary expectations are postulated in equation (3c) to depend upon the immediate
past rate of nominal monetary growth. This assumption, which is quite widely adopted in the
literature, provides a direct link between the rate of monetary growth and the short-term rate
of inflation; see e.g. Buiter and Miller (1981). At the same time, this hypothesis is arbitrary
and alternative specifications of inflationary expectations were tried. In particular, as one
measure we used the estimated value of ,obtainedby regressing ir on all predetermined
and exogenous variables, giving a quasi-rational expectations measure. The results using this
measure were not particularly successful and accordingly we have opted for the specification
in (3c).
The government Sector is spelled out in equations (4). The government budget con-
straint is defined in (4a), with the deficit (expressed in real terms) being specified in (4b).
Real tax collection is specified in (4c), with both current income and interest income being
taxed at a fixed rate r.Equation(4d) postulates the government's monetary reaction function.
The coefficient b1 reflects the extent to which the deficit is money-fmanced, while the inclu-
sion of the variables U, ,andp, reflects the ways in which monetary policy is being con-
ducted for stabilization purposes. The assumption b2> 0 means that as the unemployment
rate rises, the monetary authorities expand the real monetary base, thereby adopting a coun-
tercydical policy. The negative coefficient on irmeansthat as the current inflation rate
increases, the real monetary base is contracted, in order to reduce inflationary pressures. But
b3 <0 can also be viewed as a form of accommodating monetary policy. All other things
equal, as the current rate of inflation rises, real wealth declines, thereby reducing the demand8
forreal monetary balances. The monetary authorities accommodate this by engaging in mone-
tary contraction, thereby maintaining money market equilibrium. The positive coefficient on
the rate of monetary growth also reflects two effects. First, as the money supply increases, the
authorities increase the money base in order to meet the needs of banks. Also, the increased
monetary growth rate raises the expected inflation rate for the next period, reducing the
current real interest rate, thereby stimulating the demand for output, and hence output itself
This in turn raises the transactions demand for money and again the monetary authorities
accommodate by expanding the base.7
Note that the government budget constraint (4a), together with the monetary base rule
(4d) implies an adjustment in the stock of government bonds. Finally, in the absence of any
firm guide, we choose not to specify an adjustment for real government expenditure at this
point. While the rules we estimate for monetary and fiscal policy are ad hoc, their structure is
generally consistent with that implied by linear-quadratic stabilization theory; see Turnovsky
(1977). More specifically, the model we shall develop below reduces to a pair of linear differ-
ence equations in U andsee equations (19) and (20) below. If we assume that policy mak-
ers wish to minimize a quadratic loss function involving U and 1r, then the optimal policy
rules for the decision variables MB /P and G will be linear functions of the current state of
the system, U, andall other predetermined and exogenous variables. Not all of these,
however, prove to be statistically significant, and they are therefore omitted from the resulting
equations reported below.8
This completes the specification of the model and at this point two aspects of it should
be noted. First, the wealth measure introduced into the aggregate demand and money demand
functions include government bonds; this is in contrast to the Ricardian view. Secondly,
while the model is ad hoc, it seems a reasonable one. We should acknowledge that alternative
combinations of assumptions regarding (i) the formation of expectations and (ii) lags in ad just-
ment can lead to observationally equivalent systems. Since our ultimate concern is with9
reducedform equations, the exact mechanism is not the key issue.9
3. DERIVATION OF ESTIMATING EQUATIONS
The procedure we adopt is to express the system in terms of four linearized equations in
U, ire,r, andMB/P. This involves the following steps:
(i) Substitute the expressions for M and M from (2a), (2b) into the money market
clearing condition (2c) to yield
m(r)MB/P =L[Y,r,W_1/P] (5)
Solve (5) for rtinterms of Y, MB/P, and W/P to yield the function
=r(Y,MB/P, W/P) (6)
(ii) Linearize W/P about W/P and substitute for Y from (la) and W_1/P_1 from
(2d) and obtain the equation'°
= MB/P, ) (7)
(iii) Linearize B/P about and substitute for Y from (la) and rfrom(6) to
yield the following function for tax payments
=ib[U,MB/P, MB/P.4, B_1/P, lFt] (8)
(iv) Solve for X Z —Yby substituting Y from (la), rfrom(7), T from (8), W_1
from (2d), and irfrom(3c) into (1 b); linearize W/P about W/P and lag the resulting
equation to obtain
It-IZtl -
= D [F(U)—ib(U,MB/P.4, MBIPL_2, B...2/P_2, lrg1),
4(U_, MB.4/P, B/P_2, lFg.4) (9)
MB/P_2, Bt/Pt...Q, r] +G-F(U)
EX(U_,MB/P, B/P_2,,G)10
Linearizing (9), we obtain
—Y1=e0 +e1U_1 + e2(MB_1/P_1) + e3(MB_3/P_2)
(10)
+ e4(B_2/P_2) + east_i + e61r_1+e7G_1
For compactness, designate (10) as Q(.).
(v) The next step is to linearize the production function, yielding
Y=5U 6<0 (11)
Now substituting (11) and (10) into (Ic), we obtain the following equation describing the
change in unemployment
6U =(Q(.)) (12)
and substituting for Q (.), we derive the following estimating equation for unemployment
=10+ f 1U_1 + f 2(MB_1/P_1) + 1 3(MB_3/P_2)
(13)
+ f (B_2/P_2) + I 5Pt—1 + I 6ti + f 7G
This equation is a reduced form of the goods market and financial sector and is there-
fore essentially an aggregate demand function. It incorporates the endogenous adjustment of
taxes and the interest rate. Under plausible conditions, the sign restrictions on the coefficients
are:
0<f<1, 13<0, f3<0, f4?<0, 16<0, 16>0, 17<0
Most of these are clear. It is worth noting that while 12 <0, f 0. The reason is that an
increase in MB_I/P_1 lowers the interest rate r.4, increasing aggregate demand Z_1, which
given the lagged adjustment, lowers the unemployment rate at time t. On the other hand, an
increase in MB_2/P3 increases the demand for money at time t—l, which is contractionary
and given the lags raises the unemployment rate the next period. But it also increases the
demand for output, which is expansionary, and lowers the unemployment rate. The net
effects are therefore ambiguous. In some of our empirical work below, we shall find that f is11
approximately equal and of opposite sign to 12' indicating that the unemployment rate
responds to the change in the real money base. This is perfectly Consistent with (13).
Substituting for (3a), (3c), (Ic) and (11) into (3b), we obtain the following equation for
the rate of inflation
=pa0+pa1U+pa2L(Ut—U)+pa3p_1+(1—p)lrt_j (14)
which may be written in the form
=g0+g1U+g2(U—Ug_j)+g3j.1+g41r...j (15)
This equation is essentially an aggregate supply function, with the sign restrictions on the
coefficients being
g1<O,g2<o, O.cg3<1, Ocg4<1
We canalso derivean additionalestimating equationfor irbysubstituting forcurrent unem-
ploymentrate U from (13) into (15)
h0+h1U + h2(MB./P) + h3(MB_2/P_2)
(16) +h4(B/P) +h5p+h6f+h7G
Equation(16) is a reduced form equation for ,expressingit entirely interms ofpredeter-
mined or exogenous variables. Being obtained by combining (13) and (15) it includes both






Aconsequence of being a hybrid equation, is that the signrestrictions become less clear. For
example,one effect of an increase in Uisto lower current inflation through the Phillips
curve. But at the same time, itleads to a fall in and thisis inflationary. Assuming, as
seems plausible, that the former effect dominates, then h1<0.[Likewise, one effect of an12
increase in r_1isto shift the Phillips curve up and this is inflationary. But it also lowers real
wealth, thereby reducing aggregate demand and this is deflationary. Again assuming that the
former effect is dominant means that h6 > 0.
Since the crowding out issue deals with the effects on investment, it is also necessary to
examine the effects of monetary and fiscal policy on the real interest rate. To derive the
estimating equation, we first linearize (7) to obtain
=k0+ k1U + k2(zvfB/P) + k3(MB_1/P_1)
(17) + k4(B.4/P_) + k5ir
Subtracting the expected rate of inflation from (17) and substitutingfor ir4 yields the fol-
lowing equation for the real interest rate, g
= k0+ k1U + k2(MB/P) + k3(MB_1/P...1) + k4(B_/P)
(18) + k5r + k6j.
with the sign restrictions being
k1<0, k2<O, k3>0, k4>0, k5<0, k6.<O
These are self-evident. For reasons noted above, in some of our empirical work we find k3 to
be approximately equal in magnitude and opposite in sign to k2, in which case the real interest
rate responds to the change in the monetary base. But this is entirely an empirical
phenomenon.
For convenience, the equations to be estimated are summarized as follows:
Ut =fo+ f 1U_1 + f 2(MB_1/P_1) + 1 3(MB_2/P_2)
(19)
+ f4(B_2/P_2) + fii_ + I 6rt_1+f
=g0+ gU_1 + g2(U —U_1)+ g1 + g4ir.1 (20a)
lrg= h0+ h1U_1 + h2(MB_1/P_1) + h3(MBt...2/Pt_2)
(20b)





One important point to observe is that although we have specified a small complete
macroeconomic system, there are nocross-equationrestrictions. The reason is simply that by
Wairas' law, we have eliminated the bond market. All restrictions implied by aggregating over
the markets are reflected in the implied demand function of bonds, which, however, we do
not need to consider explicitly.
4. ESTIMATING PROCEDURES
The empirical estimates of equations (19) -(22)are reported in Tables 1-9. Any equa-
tion containing an endogenous variable on the right-hand side is estimated by two-stage least
squares (2SLS). When such an equation exhibits autocorrelated error terms a two-stage
Hildreth-Lu (TSHILU) technique is employed." For equations containing a lagged dependent
variable, the Durbin-h test is used to test for first-order autocorrelation.'2 In such equations
when autocorrelation is detected, a standard Hildreth-Lu procedure is implemented. When
there is no autocorrelation in the error terms, estimation is performed using ordinary least
squares (OLS). Whenever parameter estimates are restricted (e.g., restrictions are imposed at
times when coefficients indicate that they may be equal and opposite in sign), these restric-
tions are tested and imposed only if the restriction cannot be rejected.'3
When reporting the unemployment and inflation equations, the main focus of our
analysis, estimates of the general model are given. These are followed by "preferred equa-
tions" obtained by deleting insignificant variables and re-estimating the resulting equations. In
the case of the reaction functions and the real interest rate equations only the preferred equa-
tions are presented, in order to conserve space.14
One final point concerns the nature of the dynamic adjustment processes. As noted, our
specification of this is arbitrary, although it is hoped that with annual data, one-period lags in
the dependent variables would suffice. At the end of their paper, T-W replace the expecta-
tions assumption (3c) with an adaptive form. Their results suggest a slower adjustment pro-
cess during the first period, 1923-1960, than during the second, 1961-1982. In order to allow
for this possibility, ir and Pt—2areadded to both the unemployment and inflation equations.
These two variables are found to be significant for the first period, but not for the second,
thus lending credence to the hypothesis that the dynamic adjustment in the first period is
much slower than that of the second period.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: 1923-1960
We should stress at the outset that the results obtained for the first period are not partic-
ularly satisfactory. Thus, while the findings we shall discuss are suggestive and of interest,
they must nevertheless be viewed somewhat tentatively.
A. Unemployment Equation
It should be noted that equation (i), which corresponds to the general model (19), and
which excludes Pt—2andt—2,exhibitsthe presence of autocorrelation. When these two vari-
ables are added to this equation (not reported), the presence of autocorrelation disappears.14
This is an indication that the exclusion of these variables is a misspecification of the dynam-
ics. Very few of the variables appearing in (i) are significant. The lagged unemployment rate
in the unreported augmented equation has a coefficient which is insignificantly different from
unity. When the insignificant variables are deleted and the restrictions on the coefficients,
which are suggested by the data and tested for, are imposed, the resulting preferred equation
is (ii). This suggests an extremely simple relationship linking the change in the unemployment
rate to the change in the monetary growth rate, with a one-period lag. In the short run, a one




(i)U =6.484+ .616 Ut_i —.038(MB/P)_ —.058(MB/P)_2
(2.527)(.161) (.217) (.204)
+ .003 (B/P) + .076 — .150 +.013 G_1
(.015) (.211) (.135) (.015)






R2 =.234S.E. —5.844Dh =.660
In TbIu 1-9, numberi in parentheses denote standard errors of estimates.15
.2 percentage points in the rate of unemployment. The steady-state relationship implied by (ii)
yields no information about the long-run rate of unemployment; any rate of unemployment is
consistent with (ii).
B. Inflation Equation
The general inflation equation corresponding to (20b) is presented in (lii), with no vari-
able appearing statistically significant. As was the case for the general unemployment equa-
tion, the inclusion of p, and rg...2 adds significantly to the explanatory power. Deleting the
insignificant variables from this latter (unreported) equation, we obtain the preferred equation
(iv). This equation finds the current rate of inflation to be a function of the one and two year
lagged rates of inflation, together with the change in the real monetary base, also lagged one
year.15 Note that this equation suggests that a 1 percent increase in the real monetary base
leads to about a .22 percentage point increase in the rate of inflation, in the short run.16 In the
long run there is no effect.
Equation (v) is the preferred equation for the specification of the inflation equation
presented in (20a). This is the form estimated by Turnovsky and Wohar (1984) in their model
which excludes wealth. It indicates that in the short run a one percentage point increase in
the unemployment rate will lead to about a 1.1 percentage point decrease in the current infla-
tion rate. But again this effect is purely transitory.
In order to choose between the two alternative forms of inflation equations (iv), (v), we
apply the Davidson-MacKinnon (1981) test.7 The result of this indicates that neither specifi-
cation can be rejected in favor of the other. Both specifications embody essentially the same
information about the inflation rate. In (iv) this information appears directly, in (v) it enters
via the current unemployment rate.
Indeed, despite their apparent difference, the two equations have generally similar
characteristics. Combining (v) with the unemployment equation (iii), one finds that a oneper-




(iii)7r= —3.568+.332ir+ .053U_1 +.455(MB/P)_1





R2 =.506S.E. =15.528Dh =*
PreferredEquations (OLS)
(iv) =.8731rg— .280lrt2+ .426[(MB/P)...1 —(MB/P)....2]
(.150) (.126) (.131)
R2 =.522S.E. =15.222Dh =—.389
(v),r =—i.i07(U—U) (TSHILU)





the short-run rate of inflation. On the other hand, combining (iv) with the monetary base
reaction function (vi), one finds that a one percentage point increase in the monetary growth
rate leads to a .111 percentage point increase in the short-run rate of inflation. Furthermore,
both (iv) and (v) indicate that the steady-state rate of inflation is zero. Thus whatever the
short-run effects of changes in the monetary growth rate (Or other variables) on the inflation
rate may be, both specifications indicate that they are purely transitory.
Combining the preferred unemployment equation (ii) with either (iv) or (v), suggests that
the period 1923-1960 is characterized by an approximately zero long run rate of inflation--i.e.,
a stable price level--with an indeterminate rate of unemployment, or at least not one that we
can determine from this model. Thus while (v) indicates the existence of a short-run tradeoff
between inflation and unemployment, this is only transitory. The long-run Phillips curve is
horizontal, with a zero rate of inflation. Thus in the long run, both the unemployment rate and
the inflation rate are independent of the monetary growth rate. Thus while the monetary
growth rate exertss transitory effects on both the unemployment and inflation rates, the early
period would appear to be one in which "monetarist" mechanisms do not operate in a per-
manent way.
Although this period is not monetarist in the sense of satisfying the crucial long-run neu-
trality propositions, it does satisfy the monetary proposition asserting that only the influence
of money-financed expenditures have significant effects on inflation and employment.'8 This
claim can be seen by noting that neither real government purchases of goods and services, nor
the real stock of bonds appears significantly in either the unemployment or inflation equations.
The absence of these variables suggests that, during this period, real government purchases of
goods and services financed by either bonds or taxes have negligible effects on unemployment
or inflation. On the other hand, money-financed purchases have a direct impact on inflation,
via their effect on the change in real money base, as seen in (iv). They have an indirect effect
on the unemployment rate. This operates via the effect of the change in the real money base,17
through the money multiplier on the rate of monetary growth, which in turn has been seen to
have significant short-run effects on unemployment; see (ii).
C. Reaction Functions
The preferred monetary reaction function is reported in (vi).'° This equation suggests
that 5.7 cents of every dollar of the real deficit is monetized. The unemployment variable is
not significant, and is omitted from this equation. The current inflation rate and the monetary
growth rate, the latter being treated as a proxy for inflationary expectations, are both signifi-
cant and have the signs hypothesized in our discussion of Section 2. Note that a one percen-
tage point increase in the expected rate of inflation leads to a .26 percentage point increase in
the real monetary base, while a one percentage point increase in current inflation leads to a
.63 percentage point decline in the real monetary base.
Our attempts to estimate a reaction function for government expenditure were not par-
ticularly satisfactory.2° Thus we draw the conclusion that only monetary policy appeared to be
used for stabilization purposes over this period. Real government expenditures were set
independently and since they did not appear to influence inflation or unemployment, they had
negligible effect on the performance of the economy.
D. Real Interest Rate
Equation (vii) presents the preferred equation for the real interest reate over the early
period. While this is not central to our discussion, it is of some interest, especially in light of
the crowding out issue. In estimating (22) there is the practical matter of choosing an
appropriate measure of the real interest rate. Two most natural and widely used measures
include r —, r
—and both of these were used. However, the results were not satisfac-
tory for either period. We therefore chose to measure the real interest rate by the dividend-
price ratio, which is less volatile than these other measures and proves to be more satisfactory,
particularly in the latter period. This measure will serve as an adequate proxy for the realT3
TABLE 3
MONETARY REACTION FUNCTION: 1923-1960
(TSHILU)
(vi)(MB/P)
—(MB/P)_1=.057(DEF/P) + .261 Zt— .634
(.016) (.093)(.122)













rate, provided the real capital gain is expected to be constant in each period, which of course
is a somewhat restrictive assumption. The data used were on a composite index of 500 Stan-
dard and Poor's common stocks and are available only since 1928. Hence our early period is
somewhat truncated.
We find the real interest rate to be negatively related to the change in the real monetary
base, and positively related to the current rate of inflation. The negative coefficient of -.175
on current real base, MB/PL, reflects the familiar negative relationship between money supply
and interest rate. The positive coefficient on lagged real base, MB_1/P_1, reflects the wealth
effects in the demand for money.2' Given the mone supply, as the lagged money base and
hence W_, increases, the demand for money rises and this requires a rise in the interest rate to
occur, in order for money market equilibrium to prevail. The positive relationship between
the real interest rate and the current rate of inflation is puzzling and violates the sign restric-
tion noted below equation (18). One possible explanation is that it is reflecting the monetary
reaction function. If the rate of inflation increases, the current real monetary base is reduced,
thereby reducing the real money supply and putting upward pressure on the interest rate.
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: 1961-1982
By contrast, the results for the latter period are much stronger. The first point to note is
that the dynamic adjustment process for this period is much faster. Evidence for this is pro-
vided by the fact that additional lagged variables in the unemployment and inflation equations
are insignificant and do not increase the explanatory power of these equations. This more
rapid adjustment is consistent with the findings of our earlier study.
A. Unemployment Equation
The general unemployment equations is reported in (Viii), with the preferred equation
being given by (ix). In this latter equation, the unemployment rate depends significantly upon




(viii) U =7.264+.511U_1 —.514(MB/P) +.547(MB/P)_2
(5.578)(.102) (.230) (.288)
—.005(B/P)_ +.266+.179 —.031G_1
(.005) (.240) (.193) (.014)
R2=.913 S.E.=.605 Dh=—.916
Preferred Equation (HL)








change in the real monetary base. The form of this last variable is suggested by the fact that
(MB/P)_1, and (MB/P) enter (viii) with virtually equal magnitudes and opposite signs?
The absence of the monetary growth rate jiinthe preferred equation would appear to sug-
gest that it has no direct effect on the rate of unemployment. However, when taken in con-
junction with the monetary and fiscal reaction functions (discussed below), we see that there
is an indirect effect as a result of these policy rules.
The coefficient of -.02 on implies that a 1 percent increase in real government
expenditure, financed through either bonds or taxes, will result in about a .05 percentage point
decline in the unemployment rate in the short run? This effect translates into an elasticity of
about .83. The negative coefficient on L4MB /P]_1 indicates that a one percent increase in
the real money base leads to a .219 percentage point reduction in the unemployment rate.24
Furthermore, if the one percent increase in government expenditure is money-financed, it will
lead to a reduction in the unemployment rate of about .72 percentage points, .67 of which is
due to the induced monetary expansion?6 Thus, while bond-financed government expenditure
certainly does not completely crowd out private expenditure in the short run, the impact of
expansions in government expenditure are significantly more potent if they are money-
financed.
We now turn to the steady-state relationship implied by the preferred unemployment
equation (ix). This is given by
C= 12.469+.923F—.043
and is seen to violate both the long-run neutrality of money and the natural rate hypothesis.
In the long run, a one percentage point increase in the rate of inflation, brought about by a
one percentage point increase in the monetary growth rate, leads to a .923 percentage point
increase in the unemployment rate. Furthermore, a one percent increase in real government
expenditure, financed either by taxes or bonds, leads to a .10 percentage point decline in the
unemployment rate. However, the fact that inflation (the monetary growth rate) has an20
adverse effect on the steady state unemployment rate implies that in the long run, any increase
in government expenditure, financed through monetary growth, will be less expansionary than
if either bond financing or taxation are used.
B. Inflation Equation
The general inflation equation reported in (x) is unsatisfactory; due to multicollinearity,
only the lagged unemployment rate is statistically significant. The preferred equation, which
we found to be the most satisfactory from an economic viewpoint, is (xi). This equation
embodies an acceleration hypothesis, in which the change in the inflation rate is weakly
dependent upon the unemployment rate and strongly dependent upon the change in the real
monetary base. The short-run tradeoff between the rate of inflation and unemployment
implied by this equation is much weaker than in the initial period. By contrast, a one percent
increase in the real monetary base leads to a .6 percentage point increase in the rate of infla-
tion, somewhat larger than the corresponding effect over the 1923-1960 period. Finally,
observe that there is no direct effect of the monetary growth rate on inflation; it operates
indirectly through the monetary reaction function.
C. Policy Reaction Functions
The preferred unemployment equation, (ix), implies that the unemployment rate depends
directly upon both monetary and fiscal policy. On the other hand, (xi) suggests that inflation
depends directly upon only the former, although indirectly on the latter through the unem-
ployment rate. Table 7 reports the preferred equations for the monetary and fiscal reaction
functions.
The monetary reaction function generally accords with (4d), except for the fact that the
deficit turned out to be statistically insignificant and was dropped. The positive coefficient on
the unemployment rate indicates the implementation of countercyclical monetary policy. The
variablesandenter with approximately equal magnitudes and opposite signs in theT6
TABLE 6
INFLATION EQUATION: 196 1-1982
General Model (OLS)
(x) 1r= —25.608÷ .264 1r_1— .493Ut_i +.394(MB/P)_1
(9.048)(.386) (.190) (.379)
+.173(MB/P)_2 +.007(B/P)_2 —.117 — .056G_1
(.455) (.010) (.298) (.026)
=.924S.E. =.851Dh =* DW=1.89
Preferred Equation (OLS)
(xi) (7rt— ir..1) = —.085U.4 +.749[(MB/P)_1 —(MB/P)_2]
(.045) (.162)
R2 =.517S.E. =1.244Dh =.214
tSee footnote 11.21
unconstrained version of this equation and accordingly are introduced as a difference in the
preferred equation.
The preferred fiscal reaction function, (xiii) specifies real government expenditure to be
a negative function of the change in the real monetary base and a positive function of the
monetary growth rate. Equations (xii) and (xiii) together suggest a certain degree of inter-
dependence between fiscal and monetary policy making; fiscal policy depends upon monetary
policy, but not vice versa. Indeed, upon closer investigation, these two equations show an
assignment of instruments to targets which appear to have been in effect. Substituting the fis-
cal reaction function (xiii) into the unemployment equation (ix), it is seen that the government
expenditures are adjusted to virtually fully outset the effects of the monetary base on unem-
ployment; the coefficient on [MB /P] drops from .276 to about -.02. In effect, monetary pol-
icy is directed only towards inflation. At the same time, as the monetary growth rate increases
and the inflation rate rises, unemployment increases, and the government responds by increas-
ing its expenditure. To this extent fiscal policy is directed at unemployment.
Further credibility is given to these reaction functions by considering them from the
viewpoint of optimal stabilization policy. Suppose that the policy maker's objective is to
minimize a quadratic loss function of the form
a(Ut+i_C)2+(l
where Cisthe natural rate of unemployment (calculated below to be around 4.76% for this
period), while a and b measure relative costs. This function postulates a desire to: (i) keep
the inflation rate close to the monetary growth rate; (II) keep the unemployment rate close to
its natural rate level; (iii) minimize the instability in real activity caused by rapidly changing
unemployment. The loss function is minimized by choosing the policy variables 4MB/P1
and G subject to the constraints of the system, which are given by the pair of preferred equa-
tions (ix) and (xi).T7
TABLE 7
POLICY REACTION FUNCTIONS: 1961-1982
Monetary Policy (TSHILU)
(xii)(MB/P) —(MB/P)_1 =.118U + .533 (p —lrg)
(.042) (.088)







R2 =.828S.E. =217.789 Dh = DW=2.00
**See footnote 11.22
Differentiating with respect to [MB/P1 and G respectively, leads to the optimality
conditions:
—.085U+.749[MB/P] =
5.835+ .532U —.276[MB/P]+ .432ir —.O2OGg=aC +(1 —a)U
The first equation yields the monetary reaction function
A[MB/P] =.1l3U+ l.3350Lt —ire)





Taking C— 4.76(its estimated value) and assuming a.431, U is eliminated from this solu-
tion, which becomes
=189.17—29.978A[MB/P]+ 2I.6
The relative weight a.431 means that squared deviations in unemployment about its natural
rate are weighted slightly less than squared changes in unemployment. This does not seem
implausible.
These two optimal reaction functions are surprisingly similar to the preferred reaction
functions (xii) and (xiii). The same arguments enter, with the coefficients being of the same
sign. The magnitudes of the parameters, as one would expect, are different, but not wildly so.
Note, in particular, that this form of objective justifies a monetary rule whereand ir enter
as a difference. While we do not want to overemphasize the significance of this exercise, it
nevertheless does provide some reassurance as to the plausibility of the estimated policy reac-
tion functions.23
D. Induced Neutrality of Monetary and Fiscal Policy
The preferred unemployment and inflation equations, (ix) and (xi), indicate that the
economy is structurally nonneutral in the long run. Other things equal, changes in the mone-
tary growth rate and government fiscal policy can have long run real effects. But other things
do not remain equal and as we have seen, over the period the government has been engaged in
a process of stabilization. In this section we demonstrate how the reaction functions (xii) and
(xiii), when taken in conjunction with the preferred unemployment and inflation equations,
generate reduced form equations which exhibit the long-run neutrality monetarist proposi-
tions.
Table 8 yields unemployment and inflation equations obtained, when one substitutes the
reaction functions (xii) and (Xiii) into (ix) and (xi). These equations, which are essentially
those estimated by Stein (1978) as well as T-W, are consistent with the long-neutrality of
money and the natural rate hypothesis? The coefficient of unemployment in the inflation
equation is negligible, so that in effect the inflation rate is a weighted average of the past infla-
tion and monetary growth rates. We find the steady state of the equations by setting all lagged
and current values included in them equal to one another. Moreover, since ir andenter
the unemployment equation with more or less equal and opposite signs, the steady state of
these relationships are
C= 4.76
That is, in the long run, the inflation rate equals the monetary growth rate, while the unem-
ployment rate converges to a natural rate of around 4.76 percent.
Part B of Table 8 presents direct estimates of these same equations, with the insignifi-
cant variable deleted from the inflation equation.27 These results turn out to be virtually ident-
ical to those in Part A, showing the same long-run neutrality properties. The inflation rate is aT8
TABLE 8




B. Direct Estimation of Reduced Form Unemployment and Inflation Equations 196 1-1982
(xiv) U =2.373+.518U —.328p +.454 (OLS) (.794)(.133) (.101) (.085)
R2 =.836S.E..503 Dh —.277 (OLS)
(xv)ir =.477 + .550
(.127) (.125)
R2 =.960S.E.1.505 Dh .070 DW =1.9724
weighted average of past inflation and monetary growth rates, while the implied natural rate
of unemployment is around 4.9%.
Since equations (xiv) and (xv) are appealing forms of the preferred equations, we have
performed Davidson-MacKinnon specification tests on the pairs (ix)-(xiv) and (xi)-(xv),
respectively. These tests rejected (xiv) in favor of (ix) and (xv) in favor of (xi). Taken in the
context of this study, these findings can be interpreted as meaning that the accepted equations
(Our preferred equations) contain more information about unemployment and inflation than do
(xiv) and (xv), which contaminate that information with the reaction functions.
The finding by Turnovsky and Wohar (1984) that the monetarist neutrality propositions,
found to hold over the period 1961-1982, can be viewed as being generated by government
policy, rather than being intrinsic to the economic structure, is strengthened by the introduc-
tion of separate monetary and fiscal reaction functions. It should be emphasized that real
government expenditure (financed either by money, bonds, or taxation), is not in and of itself
ineffective. On the contrary, in the absence of policy reactions, a once and for all increase in
government expenditure will have real effects on unemployment, both in the short run and in
steady state. But what the policy reaction function (xiii) suggests is that fiscal policy over this
period did not in fact remain passive in this way.
In the case of monetary policy, consider e.g. a one-percentage point increase in the rate
of monetary growth. In response to this, the monetary reaction function (xii) suggests that the
real money base is increased by .533units.There is also a fiscal response, described by (xiii),
and this has two components. On the one hand, the increase in the monetary growth rate
encourages an increase in real government expenditure. On the other hand, the fiscal authori-
ties compensate for the expansion in the real money base by decreasing real government
expenditure. On balance, the former effect dominates and real government expenditure is
increased by around 7.78 units. As a consequence of the expansion in the real money base,
the inflation rate in the next period rises by around .4 percentage points. At the same time,25
the combination of the expansionary monetary and fiscal policies causes the unemployment
rate to falL This, coupled with the rise in the inflation rate, leads to a decline in the increase
in the real money base; I(MB /P) drops from .533 to .284. The fiscal authority in turn com-
pensates for this reduction in the rate of increase of the real money base by now increasing its
real government expenditure. The reduction in (MB/P), together with the lagged adjust-
ment in the rate of inflation, means that the inflation rate continues to increase, but at a slower
rate. The combination of a less expansionary monetary policy and a more expansionary fiscal
policy, together with the rising inflation rate, means that the initial fall in the unemployment
rate is reduced. Over time, this switch from monetary policy towards fiscal policy continues,
with the result that the inflation rate ultimately converges to the new (higher) monetary
growth rate, while unemployment is restored to its original level?
E. Real Interest Rate Equation
The real interest rate equation is reported in (xvi). It is very Fisherian in the sense that
the real interest rate is to depend upon only real variables and to be independent of nominal
variables such as the monetary growth rate or the rate of inflation. This finding also tends to
support the general monetarist characteristics of the economy over this period. Loosely
speaking, this equation can be interpreted as saying that the real interest rate is determined
essentially by effects operating along the economy's IS curve. The positive coefficient on the
unemployment rate corresponds to the downward sloping IS curve. The positive coefficients
on lagged monetary base and government bonds reflects the fact that as wealth increases, the
IS curve shifts out, driving up the real interest rate.
We find the results of this equation to be quite impressive. It is the only equation in
which we find the real stock of bonds to be significant. This equation implies that the only
impact of government expenditure on the real interest rate is through its induced effects on
the monetary base and bonds, as well as the unemployment rate. To the extent that it raises
wealth, increased government expenditure has a positive effect on the real interest rate; to theT9
TABLE 9
REAL INTEREST RATE EQUATION
Preferred Equation, 1961-1982 (2SLS)
(xvi)i =—11.472 + .211 Ut + .127 (MB/P)_1 + .017 (B/P)1
(1.668)(.058) (.015) (.003)
R2 =.888S.E. =.129Dh = DW=1.93
tSee footnote 1126
extent that it lowers the unemployment rate this is offset by a negative effect. Combining
equation (xvi) with the unemployment equation (ix) it can be shown that one percent increase
in government expenditure which is bond-financed leads to a .031 percentage point increase
in the real interest rate. However, a one percent increase in government expenditure which is
money-financed, leads to a .157 percentage point increase in the real interest rate. Surpris-
ingly, the crowding out effect, proxied by the real interest rate, and which is only modest
under bond financing, is substantially greater under money financing. This is because, even
though the (negative) unemployment effect is larger under money financing, the wealth effect,
which dominates the unemployment effect in both cases, is more dominant in that case?°
7. CONCLUSIONS
The extension of our previous analysis to incorporate a more completely specified
government sector not only leads to a substantial improvement in the quality of our results,
but also assists in our understanding of them. The results suggest a number of striking differ-
ences between the two subperiods 1923-1960 and 1961-1982.
(i) The early period suggested a substantial short-run tradeoff between inflation and
unemployment in the later period this tradeoff is negligible.
(ii) In the early period, the long-run Phillips curve is horizontal at a zero rate of infla-
tion (stable price level); in the later period it is vertical at a natural rate of about 5%.
(lii)In both periods the rate of inflation in the short-run is positively related to the
change in the real monetary base, with the effect being somewhat stronger in the more recent
period.
(iv) In the early period, the rate of unemployment appears to depend directly upon (and
essentially only on) the monetary growth rate; in the later period it depends only indirectly
upon this variable, through the monetary reaction function.27
(v) The real stock of government bonds does not appear to have a significant impact on
the rate of inflation or the unemployment rate in either period. In the early period only
money-financed government expenditure has significant effects on unemployment or inflation.
In the later period, bond-financed government expenditure does have some effect on unem-
ployment, but much less than if the expenditure is money-financed.
(vi) The absence of a satisfactory fiscal policy reaction function for 1923-1960 suggests
that only monetary policy was used for stabilization purposes during that period. The inter-
dependence between the fiscal and monetary reactions for the 1961-1982 period indicates that
these policies were more closely related during the later period. Moreover, when taken
together, these results suggest an assignment of instruments to targets over the recent past; fis-
cal policy has been directed at stabilizing unemployment, monetary policy being directed at
inflation.
(vii) The existence of a natural rate of unemployment and the neutrality of money,
shown to hold for the late period, are not intrinsic to the economy, but rather are the result of
the government stabilization policies being conducted over that period.
(viii) It was found that deficits have a small, but significant, impact on the change in the
real monetary base during the early period, but not during the later period.
(ix) The results suggest that the dynamics of the first period were much slower than
those of the later period. A plausible explanation for this can be given in terms of the dif-
ferent inflationary history characterizing these two periods. During the first period, without
the fear of rapidly rising prices, individuals may have found it too costly to form expectations
about the future in any sophisticated way and continually adjust their behavior. On the other
hand, during the later period, with its rising inflation and concomitant costs to those not anti-
cipating it, it became too costly not to form expectations rapidly and make the appropriate
adjustments. Institutions generally have become more geared to adapting to inflation.28
One of the major objectives of this study was to examine the impacts of alternative
modes of financing deficits. One prevalent, and perhaps surprising, finding was that the bond
stock was not found to influence any of the economic magnitudes considered in this study
except for a small effect on the real interest rate during the period 1961-1982. One might
attempt to explain this absence of bonds in any of the equations by claiming that the wealth
effects on consumption were offset by the opposite effects on money demand. One might also
attribute this finding to the Ricardian Equivalence Proposition. Although these are all plausi-
ble explanations we choose to offer a third possible explanation. Until recently, deficits may
have been viewed by economic agents as temporary or cyclical. That is, that existing deficits
were the result of wars or recessions and once economic growth increased these deficits would
decline substantially. This is underscored by the relatively small Full-Employment deficits
that have existed until the end of 1982. However, recently (after 1982) the U.S. has experi-
enced relatively large structural (Full-Employment) deficits well above $100 billion, which are
expected to Continue for years to come. Of course we will have to wait many years to see the
evidence, but, these large structural deficits may lead economic decision makers to change
their views of deficits and the effects of alternative modes of financing them. In the future we
may find that continuing to finance large deficits by the issuance of bonds will have deleteri-
ous effects on economic growth even though this may not have been the case, for the most
part, in previous years.
Finally, two limitations of our analysis should be noted. First, it abstracts from physical
capital accumulation. The demand side of investment is proxied, at least to some extent, by
the real interest rate variable embodied in the demand function. However, the supply effects
which operate through the production function are not incorporated in the analysis. In their
earlier work, T-W conducted some preliminary tests by modifying the production function to
include capital stock. The results in doing this, however, were disappointing. Whether this
was due to poor capital stock data or to the inadequate specification of capital in the model is
unclear. Secondly, the model assumes that government bonds and corporate equities are29
perfect substitutes, so that the real rate of return on bonds is the relevant cost of capital.
Recent empirical work, however, questions the validity of this assumption. Further considera-
tion of these issues is clearly desirable.F!
FOOTNOTES
*Theconstructive comments of two referees are gratefully acknowledged.
1.The propositions tested are stated by Stein (1978). He in turn attributes these views pri-
marily to Brunner (1970) and Friedman (1970, 1973).
2.For details on how the structural break was determined, see Turnovsky and Wohar
(1984). Similar breaks have been found by previous authors; see, e.g., Klein (1976), Rea
(1983).
3.For a detailed discussion of the econometric problems which arise when one does not
incorporate endogenous monetary and fiscal policies into the estimation of macro models
see Goldfeld and Blinder (1972)
4.The introduction of real wealth in the form W_1/P can be justified in terms of the end-
of-period equilibrium approach; see Turnovsky (1977).
5.In effect we are abstracting from issues relating to the Ricardian equivalence proposi-
tion.
6.See, e.g., Solow (1968) and Turnovsky and Wachter (1972).
7.The behavioral function (4d) represent an admittedly simplified version of the money
supply process, and exclude important behavioral characteristics of the financial sector
that have been analyzed in previous studies (for example, see Brunner and Meltzer
(1964), de Leeuw (1965) and Goldfeld (1966)). However, they adequately serve the pur-
pose of allowing the estimation of a money-base reaction function within the context of a
model of the economy.
8.The study of reaction functions can be extended in various directions. For example, it
would be of interest to analyze reaction functions for the different components of
government expenditure, such as social security expenditures, etc. Or, one could investi-
gate rules for endogenizing the tax rate. Detailed studies in these directions, while
clearly of interest, lie outside the scope of the present paper.
9.Note that the model also contains q, the price of government bonds. This can be deter-
mined as the solution to the asset pricing relationship
l/q +(q4j,
—
whereq.1g is the forecast of q for time t+ 1,formed at time t.
10. We1 W W W P P1 (P.j
11. In ordinary least squares equations the Durbin-Watson statistic is generally used to test
for autocorrelation. If one of the independent variables is a lagged dependent variable in
an OLS regression, the Durbin-h test is used. However, Godfrey (1978) has shown that
the Durbin-h test, based on instrumental variable results (as in 2SLS), is not a recom-
mended test for serial correlation. However, by examining the t-statisticfor the value of
the autocorrelation coefficient obtained from employing the Fair (1970) (i.e., TSHILU)
2SLS autoregressive procedure can give an indication of the presence of serial correla-
tion. If the autocorrelation coefficient is significantly different from zero then the
TSHILU technique is employed; otherwise, a standard 2SLS procedure is employed.
12. Durbin (1970) has shown that
Dh =(1—F- /T/(l
—TLvar(flu)])
where DW is the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic, T is the total number ofF2
observations, var(81) is the variance of the coefficient associated with the lagged depen-
dent variable. Dh is approximately normally distributed with unit variance. The critical
value for a level of significance of .05is1.645 (-1 .64 5).
Itis important to note that the Durbin-h test is not valid when Tvar($)isgreater than
1. In this case Durbin proposes an alternative test. We obtain the residual variable &'




Yisthe lagged dependent variable,
X is the vector of contemporaneous independent variables,
visa normally distributed disturbance term.
If Aissignificantly different from zero then we reject the null hypothesis of no first-
order serial correlation and must correct for it.
13. The method used for restricting parameter estimates is to introduce aLagrangian param-
eter for each restriction (see Pringle and Raynor, 1971). The estimates of theseparame-
ters are printed with test statistics. The Lagrangian parameter A measures the sensitivity
of the SSE to the restriction constant. If the restriction constant is changedby a small
amount, e, the SSE is changed by 2AE. The t ratio tests the significance of the restriction.
If A is zero, the restricted estimates are the same as the unrestricted, anda change in the
restriction constant in either direction increases the SSE.
14. Estimates of these general equations are available from the authorsupon request.
15.Theinclusion of the change in the real money base is suggested by the fact that
(MB/P)_1and(MB/P)_2enter(iii) with approximately equal and opposite signs. This
is equivalent to setting e2 =—e3in equation (10). The underlying model is sufficiently
general to permit this restriction. In terms of the basic structure
e2[—D1i(B..4/P_)+D2]8r...1/8(MB_1/p_1)
e3[—D1i(B_1/p_1)+D2]8r_i/8(iifB_2/p_2)+aD/a(MB_2/p_2)
The term 0r_1/8(MB_1/p_1) measures the effect of a change in the current realmoney
base on the current interest rate. In effect this represents a downward shift in the LM
curve and is negative. Thus, given the signs of D1, D2 in (Ib), e2 >0.On the other
hand, 8r_i/ä(MB_2/P_2) measures the effect of the lagged realmoney base on the
current interest rate. This arises through wealth effects in the demand foroutput and
real money balances. These represent upward shifts in both the IS and LMcurves, the
effects of which are positive. Thus the first component ofe3 <0.The second com-
ponent of e3 reflects the wealth effect on the demand for output which is positive.
Depending upon the relative shifts it is certainly possible for e2—e3,asthe empirical
evidence suggests.
16. This semi-elasticity is evaluated at the mean MB_I/P_1forthe period, which equals
$50.753 billion.
17.Fora discussion of these particular specification tests and how to implement them, see
Davidson and MacKinnon (1981).
18.For the particular definition of the long-run neutrality proposition used in thispaper as
well as by Stein and others two conditions must be met: (i) the steady-state rate ofunem-
ployment must be independent of the steady-state rate of monetary expansion, and (ii)
the steady-state rate of inflation must be equal to the steady-state rate ofmonetary
expansion.
19. Observe that the explanatory variables are introduced in the reaction functionscontem-
poraneously, suggesting that these variables are known immediately to the stabilizationF3
authorities. Note, however, that since both the monetary and fiscal reaction functions
are estimated using 2SLS procedures, the endogenous variables are in fact replaced by
estimates, obtained from the first stage regression. These can be viewed as measuring
policy makers' expectations of these variables. Thus the reaction functions can be inter-
preted as responding to predicted, rather than to realized values.
20.Afiscal reaction function was estimated although not reported in the tables because (Ge)
was absent from the preferred inflation and unemployment equations. The preferred
equation is as follows
G =185.216 +6.301 [(MB/P) —(MB_1/P...1)J
—8.693U
(39.545) (1.259) (2.963)
R2 =.856S.E. =28.3659DW =1.39Dh =
= .860
(.084)
The wrong sign on the U term and the low Durbin-Watson statistic even after using
(TSHILU) would tend to indicate a possible misspecification, spurious correlation, or
wrong specification of causality.
21.Since in general the different components of wealth need not all have identical effects on
the demand for money, this interpretation is not inconsistent with B...1 being insignifi-
cant in this equation.
22. The comments in footnote 15 apply here as well.
23. This calculation as well as the corresponding steady-state effect is evaluated at the mean
value for the period, G =$243(billion).




Setting d(MB/P)_1= dG.4andconsidering a 1% increase in G evaluated at the mean,
so that dG= 2.43,we find
dU=—.296x 2.43 =—.72
26. These estimates differ slightly from those in our previous paper, due to the updating of
the data.
27. When unemployment was added to the inflation equation (xv) it was insignificant and
was dropped.
28. The steady state of the model is one in which U =C,=p;we do not require
A[MB/P] =0.Indeed, if the government wishes to sustain the unemployment rate at U,
the monetary reaction function implies that the real monetary base must be allowed to
increase steadily. This presents no problem for the steady state of the system defined by
the preferred equations (ix) and (xi), since these depend only upon the change in MB /P.
However, it appears from the real interest rate equation (xvi) that this is incompatible
with a long-run constant real interest rate, since this depends upon the level of MB/P.
This need not necessarily be so, since i also depends upon the stock of bonds, which for
a given real deficit typically will be decreasing steadily to finance the monetary expan-
sion. It is possible for the offset to be sufficiently close so that the net effect of the real
monetary base and bonds on the real interest rate are approximately offsetting.F4
We have also followed a referee's suggestion and imposed as a steady-state condition and
introduced a constant into (xi), thereby allowing for a non-zero steady-state unemploy-
ment rate. But the overall results did not prove to be satisfactory.
29. These calculations are evaluated at the mean values of G =$243(billion) over the




The effect under money financing is given by
di =.211dU +.127d(MB/P)_1
where dU =—.276d(MB/P)...1 —.02dG_1 and d(MB/P)_1 =dG_1=2.43.Al
APPENDIX
Description and Sources of Data
P is the implicit price deflator for Gross National Product (GNP) and is computed by divid-
ing GNP in current dollars by GNP in 1972 dollars. Hence, its value is unity in 1972 base
period. The rate of inflation
=(P
—
Sources:1923-1950 [11], 1951-1982 [12].
P.1 is the annual average of the money supply (Ml) measured in billions of current dollars.
The monetary growth rate z= (M—
Sources:1923-1959 [10], 1960-1982 [3]
MB is the annual average of the monetary base (high-powered money)
Sources: 1923-1982 [31
U is civilian unemployment rate (in percent) calculated as the number of persons unemployed
divided by the civilian labor force.
Sources: 1923-1929 [7], 1929-1939 [2], 1940-1982 [13]
G is real government purchases of goods and services by federal, state, and local governments
and is measured in billions of 1972 dollars.
Sources: 1923-1928 [6], 1929-1950 [11], 1951-1982 [12]
i is the real interest rate proxied by the dividend-to-price ratio on 500 common stocks. It is a
composite index of these 500 common stocks.
Sources: 1923-1982 [9]
B is the market value of domestic net federal debt held by the public. Net federal debt is
defined as gross federal debt less debt held by agencies and trust funds. The market value of
debt is calculated by multiplying the ratio of market to par value by the par value of domestic
net federal debt. (June figures are used.)
Par value of net domestic federal debt Sources: 1923—1940 [4]
1941—1982 [3,5]
Ratio of market to par value: Sources: 1923—1957 [8]
1958—1982 [1]A2
DEF is a measure of the deficit. It is calculated as the difference between Net Federal Debt
in period tandNet Federal Debt in period t—1.(June figures are used.)Ri
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